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SAS Warlord: Shoot to Kill. By Tom Siegriste. Philadelphia,
PA: Casemate Publishers, 2011. ISBN: 978-1-61200-035-0.
Glossary. Pp. 299.
Tom Siegriste's brief paperbound book purports to be the biography of a
former sergeant major who served in Britain's Special Air Services (SAS)
and was later recruited from his regular regiment to serve in a specialized
unit known as the Military Reaction Force (MRF) operating in Belfast,
Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. That unit is also named more accurately in scholarly sources as the Military Reconnaissance Force. The
identity of Siegriste's protagonist, who used the pseudonym Jack
Gillespie, remains unknown. According to Siegriste, Gillespie died while
swimming in his pool in Spain, where he was living out his retirement in
septuagenarian seclusion.
Unfortunately, since this book contains no supporting documentation, no
interviews with anyone who could support Gillespie's recollections, and is
written in a fashion that indicates the author might have had a screenplay
in mind, its veracity is naturally suspect and its usefulness by scholars is
seriously undermined. Nonetheless, the existence of the MRF has been
substantiated, as have at least some of the operations discussed in the
book. If Gillespie's tale is true, however, Siegriste's ghostwriting effort has
done him a great disservice by presenting the story in a fashion that raises
suspicion about its truth. In short, it reads like a bad adventure novel.
Moreover, the MRF was short-lived, supposedly due to recognition of its
amateurish, heavy-handed tactics. Gillespie's tale seems to add credence
to that notion.
It is now known that the MRF operated as an undercover unit in Northern
Ireland in the early 1970s, yet details of its sensitive role remain sketchy.
Thus, one of the most instructive pieces of information that could potentially come out of a book of this sort is a discussion of the kinds of operational tactics that were used to counter Irish Republican Army (IRA)
activities at that time, and the means by which some British operations
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were compromised. Because of the skepticism many readers will immediately feel, the book's usefulness is likely to be marred even in regard to the
operational details.
If Siegriste and Gillespie are to be believed, Gillespie successfully
operated by day by posing as a photojournalist, developing romantic
relationships with local women—some of whom happened to have close
relatives in the IRA—and fending off his lasses' jealous former suitors by
knocking them senseless. When he worked, Gillespie would drive to the
British Army compound in County Down from which the MRF operated,
and which apparently was never under any type of surveillance by the
IRA, drive out in an unmarked, hardened vehicle that had been stolen or
seized locally and then altered to provide some armored protection, shoot
up some IRA types in a tactic they called "shoot and scoot" (p. 18), and
leave the Royal Irish Constabulary to sort out the mess and blame the
entire affair on the Unionist paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force.
Apparently the heavily armed MRF patrols simply prowled the streets in
their unmarked cars on the off chance they would encounter some armed
IRA men they could engage. There's no significant discussion of the role
MI6 or other intelligence gathering efforts might have played, and as a
senior non-commissioned officer, Gillespie surely would have been privy
to that information in pre-operational briefings. Still, it seems likely that
the patrols were designed to gather information in response to
intelligence, and if things turned ugly, the MRF was prepared and
apparently eager to engage targets of opportunity. In that sense, it also
seems likely that the MRF did have "shoot to kill" orders, but whether that
was their first priority or not remains subject to question.
When intelligence efforts are discussed, it is in typical dramatic fashion
that highlights the stereotypical conflict between the "suits" and the operators. In one case, the mishandling of an informant by MI6 is blamed for
the disastrous compromise and end of a British operation. In fact, Siegriste mentions only the failed operations that already have been
acknowledged as reality and openly discussed in other sources, though he
mentions none of those corroborating sources and never expands beyond
his simple storytelling methods in an attempt to substantiate any portions
of his tale. As a result, the book is not satisfactory as history, nor is it a
good memoir. Readers are simply asked to take Jack Gillespie's story at
face value. Naturally, there are a number of problems with that. First, as
mentioned, there is rarely any supporting evidence provided or substantiation by other participants. Second, the subject of Siegriste's work conveniently dies of natural causes as noted in the closing chapter of the book,
before his hair-raising tale was published. Third, it is decidedly onedimensional storytelling; it is a biographical piece that places Jack
88
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Gillespie as the centerpiece, but without the interpretation and context
that Siegriste might have provided had he looked further. Is this really the
memoir of Jack Gillespie, or is it a conglomeration of his memories of
events he participated in, witnessed, or heard about from others and
repeated to his ghostwriter, or is it largely fabrication? Readers are left to
decide that on their own, but the evidence to back the first option is not
strong.
All of those criticisms come prominently to view in one of the later chapters of the book where Gillespie reveals one of the bombshells that created
a minor stir when the book was released in the United Kingdom. According to Gillespie, an MRF team had been assigned to assassinate IRA
leader Gerry Adams during an IRA meeting scheduled for June 23 at a
community center in Andersontown. The plan called for three carloads of
MRF members to park along the main road near the community center
and there to await Adams' arrival. One of the cars was to be parked only
about fifty yards from the location where Adams was expected to enter the
building. Once Adams arrived, he would be gunned down in a hail of bullets from the heavily armed MRF teams. Is it possible the IRA would have
been so cavalier about Adams' security as to allow three carloads of
heavily armed men to loiter within deadly range of one of their most
important figures? As we all well know, Adams was not assassinated that
day. Instead, just as Gillespie was about to give the "go" signal to his team,
a frantic radio call ordered him to abort the mission and return to base. A
split second longer and Adams would have been dead. Interviewed by the
Western Mail about this claim, ghostwriter Siegriste unabashedly quotes
himself from that interview: "Hopefully someone will read this account
and publish this book, or make a film from the book or a TV series" (p.
270). Thus far, it appears no one has stepped forward to make that film or
TV series, but Siegriste has at least seen his work in print. Unfortunately, I
cannot recommend that readers of this journal purchase it. It is a short
read, mildly entertaining, but not particularly well written, and best left
on the bookstore shelf.
Edward J. Hagerty, Ph.D., American Military University
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